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SYNTHETIC GOVERNANCE
Byung Hyun Ahn, Jill E. Fisch, Panos N. Patatoukas,
& Steven Davidoff Solomon*
Although securities regulation is distinct from corporate
governance, the two fields have considerable substantive
overlap. By increasing the transparency and efficiency of the
capital markets, securities regulation can also enhance the
capacity of those markets to discipline governance decisions.
The importance of market discipline is heightened by the
increasingly vocal debate over what constitutes “good”
corporate governance.
Securities product innovation offers new tools to address
this debate. The rise of index-based investing provides a
market-based mechanism for selecting among governance
options and evaluating their effects. Through the creation of
bespoke governance index funds, asset managers can create
indexes that correspond to investors’ governance preferences.
We argue that this “synthetic governance” offers a way to
gather evidence on the economic impact of corporate
governance by providing a market-based tool for evaluating
the relationship between corporate governance and stock
returns.
We illustrate the potential of synthetic governance by
creating a new governance-based index, the Dual Index, which
selects portfolio companies on the basis of a dual class voting
structure and comparing its performance to various
benchmarks. We further modify the Dual Index by
implementing synthetic sunsets to highlight the value creation
of dual class companies in their early years and provide
* Byung Hyun Ahn is a PhD student at the University of California
Berkeley, Haas School of Business; Jill E. Fisch is the Saul A. Fox
Distinguished Professor of Business Law at the University of Pennsylvania
Law School; Panos N. Patatoukas is an Associate Professor and the L. H.
Penney Chair in Accounting at the University of California Berkeley, Haas
School of Business; Steven Davidoff Solomon is Professor of Law at the
University of California Berkeley, School of Law.
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evidence on the appropriate length of a time-based sunset
provision. Finally, we expand our analysis of synthetic
governance with a second index—the Split Index—which tests
the effect of separating the positions of CEO and chairman of
the board. We
conclude that synthetic governance
demonstrates the ability of securities market innovation to
discipline corporate governance.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between corporate law and securities
regulation is complex.1 When Congress adopted the federal
securities laws, it consciously rejected a federal corporation
statute in favor of disclosure-based regulation of the capital
markets that would co-exist with state corporation law.2 That
system of dual sovereignty remains to the present day.
Nonetheless, there is substantial overlap between the two
1 See, e.g., James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between
Corporate and Securities Law, 64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 118 *2017) (“The
relationship between corporate and securities law has always been a close
one[.]”).
2 See, e.g., Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Federal Corporation Law, in 20 J. LEGAL EDUC. 529, 529 (1968) (“As you
know, Congress has consistently rejected proposals for a general federal
corporation statute.”).
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regulatory systems. Both state and federal law regulate the
shareholder voting process.3 Federal securities litigation has
been used as a tool to supplement limited state law remedies
for officer and director misconduct.4 And the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002 expanded federal regulation to a range of
corporate governance practices.5
The entangling of state and federal law stems, in part, from
the fact that the capital markets serve to discipline corporate
behavior. A corporation’s choice of its state of incorporation
and its governance structure, as well as the quality of its
management and business strategy, are reflected in the
market price of its stock.6 By promoting transparent and
efficient capital markets, federal securities regulation thus
has the potential to increase the market’s ability to promote
economically beneficial corporate law and governance.
Capital market innovation can enhance this process.
Today’s capital markets do not limit investors to purchasing
traditional stocks and bonds. New investment products
abound—from stock slices, to indexed ETFs, to SPACs. These
products allow investors to invest in a broad range of
businesses, frequently at low transaction costs made possible
through automation and scale. They also allow investors to
increase their diversification as well as invest in a more
directed manner. These innovative products can spur

3 See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy
Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1132 (1993) (describing “the dual system
under which shareholder voting is regulated, which includes both the
federal proxy rules and state corporation law”).
4 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as
Corporate Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859,
863 (2003) (demonstrating empirically that “federal securities fraud
litigation operates much like state fiduciary duty litigation in policing
corporate governance”).
5 Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (2005) (describing
Congress as introducing through the Sarbanes-Oxley Act “a series of
corporate governance initiatives into the federal securities laws”).
6 See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., The Development of the Law of Corporate
Governance, 9 DEL J. CORP. L. 524, 527–28 (1984).
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companies to adopt more economically beneficial
characteristics.
We introduce one such product here that highlights the
potential of the new securities market: the bespoke
governance index fund. Advances in the structure and scope
of our capital markets now allow investors to select into
investment products that implement their governance
preferences. We term this approach “synthetic governance.”
More specifically, we argue that investors can use index funds
to structure their investment decisions based on their
assessments as to which corporate governance structures can
(and cannot) create economic value.7 Such funds provide
market-based mechanisms for evaluating the relationship
between corporate governance and economic value—a
relationship that is, in many areas, hotly contested. In short,
synthetic governance provides a new tool by which the capital
markets can discipline corporate governance.
In this Article we develop the concept of synthetic
governance. We explain that existing securities regulation has
facilitated the growth of index investing as a strategy for
enabling investors to obtain a diversified portfolio at a
relatively low cost. These features, as well as economies of
scale, have led to substantial inflows into index funds.8
Although the initial index funds were based on broad
market indexes such as the S&P 500, index investing can be
used to implement any rules-based approach to investment
selection and portfolio composition.9 Consequently, index fund
7 Index funds do not make information-based trading decisions and
instead hold securities based on their inclusion in a designated index. See
Jill Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of
Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. PA. L.
REV. 17, 19 (2019) (describing index investing). We use the term “index
fund” here to include both indexed mutual funds and exchange-traded funds
(ETFs). ETFs are “publicly traded on the [secondary] market rather than
purchased directly from (or sold to) the fund sponsor.” Id. at 19 n.4.
8 See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99
B.U. L. REV. 721, 727, 729 (2019).
9 See Andrew W. Lo, What Is an Index?, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter
2016, at 21, 22–25 (recounting the history of index funds and explaining
that an index must be transparent, investible, and systematic, the latter
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sponsors have created an ever-expanding variety of
specialized or bespoke index funds.10 The SHE ETF tracks the
SSGA Gender Diversity Index, which is comprised of
companies that are advancing women on their boards and in
senior management.11 Another example, the BUZZ ETF, was
launched in March 2021, following the social-media-fueled
trading frenzy in meme stocks.12 BUZZ tracks an index of
stocks based on their popularity on social media.13
We argue that index technology similarly enables investors
to select into or out of preferred governance mechanisms,
more closely tying the capital markets with the market for
corporate governance. Although large asset management
firms do not currently appear to offer investors index funds
that invest on the basis of governance provisions, such indexes
could allow investors to exclude firms that incorporate valuedecreasing governance provisions without sacrificing the low
cost and diversification afforded by an index strategy.14
Notably, synthetic governance allows investors to make
governance-based investment decisions without the heavy
hand of regulatory intervention. Rather than the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the stock exchanges
prohibiting the use of dual class voting structures, synthetic
“meaning that the index’s construction must be rules-based and not
dependent on any discretion or human judgment”); Adriana Z. Robertson,
Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36
YALE J. ON REGUL. 795, 810–33 (2019) (providing a taxonomy of index types).
10 Robertson, supra note 9, at 821 (explaining the concept of a bespoke
index).
11 SPDR® SSGA Gender Diversity ETF, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://money.usnews.com/
funds/etfs/large-blend/spdr-ssga-gender-diversity-etf/she (last visited Apr.
7, 2021).
12 Emily Nicolle, Why VanEck’s New Meme Stocks ETF Might Not Be
Reddit-Worthy, BARRON’S, https://www.marketwatch.com/articles/whyvanecks-new-meme-stocks-etf-might-not-be-reddit-worthy51615308160?mod=mw_quote_news [https://perma.cc/C8BY-P9N7] (last
updated Mar. 9, 2021, 11:46 AM).
13 Id.
14 Actively-managed funds can take governance factors into account,
although the degree to which they do so is unclear, in part because activelymanaged investment strategies are proprietary.
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governance would enable an investor to invest in a mutual
fund that excludes dual class stocks.15 Index fund strategies
could also be tailored more precisely. So, for example, rather
than excluding all dual class firms from its portfolio, a fund
could disinvest from companies with dual class stock if the
dual class does not sunset after a pre-specified period of time,
creating, in effect, a synthetic sunset.
We argue that synthetic governance offers three potential
benefits. First, it provides a market-based mechanism to test
the economic value of controversial governance provisions. If
critics of such governance provisions are correct, governancebased index funds should outperform their broad-based
competitors. Second, synthetic governance may lead to more
efficient allocation of capital by drawing inflows into funds
that properly evaluate the economic value of governance.
Third, synthetic governance can enhance management
accountability by providing passive investors a mechanism for
subjecting the governance choices of their portfolio companies
to capital market discipline. There are also systemic effects—
if bespoke governance indexes are successful in attracting
investor assets, firms may proactively adopt specific
governance practices to qualify for inclusion.
We go on to provide a practical illustration of our theory of
synthetic governance by constructing and evaluating the
performance of a novel bespoke governance index, the Dual
Index.16 The Dual Index permits the evaluation of dual class
companies in response to the debate over dual class voting
structures. The Dual Index further provides a tool for
implementing sunset provisions for dual class voting
structures by dropping companies from the index if they fail
to eliminate that dual class structure after a pre-specified
number of years following their IPOs. In other words, the Dual
Index imposes a synthetic sunset for dual class companies.
15 See infra Section IV.A (evaluating a portfolio using the opposite
rule). As developed later, we distinguish an investment product that
expressly selects for or against a particular governance provision from a
decision by a broad-based index such as the S&P 500 to exclude a firm based
on governance criteria.
16 See infra Part IV.
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We examine the performance of this index over a period of
time. We find that over a back-testing period from June 2009
to December 2019, the Dual Index earned an annual return of
19.23% with a standard deviation of 14.39%, while the market
index earned an annual return of 14.98% with a standard
deviation of 12.98%. The Dual Index performance corresponds
to a monthly multi-factor alpha of thirty-one basis points. We
modify the Dual Index by implementing synthetic sunsets to
provide evidence on the appropriate length of a time-based
sunset provision. Our results highlight that value creation in
the Dual Index occurs to a greater extent in the early years
after a dual class firm’s IPO.
We expand our analysis of synthetic governance with a
second index—the Split Index—which tests the effect of
separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board.
We find that the Split Index outperforms the market as well.
Our findings support our thesis that synthetic governance
can be used to generate excess returns. They also highlight
the importance of securities market innovation as a response
to changing firm structures and governance norms. The
performance of both the Dual Index and the Split Index run
contrary to conventional wisdom about “best practices” in
corporate governance. Although regulators have raised
concerns about the potential complexity and opacity of new
market products,17 these products demonstrate the
continuing effectiveness of the market as an alternative to
one-size-fits-all investment and governance practices in an
evolving economy.

17 See Press Release, Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Dalia Blass, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
William Hinman, Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n & Brett
Redfearn, Dir., Div. of Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Joint
Statement Regarding Complex Financial Products and Retail Investors
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-blasshinman-redfearn-complex-financial-products-2020-10-28
[https://perma.cc/9YN2-C8MJ] (noting the “increasing number and type of
investment products that are more complex than conventional stock and
bond investments” and warning of the risks that such products pose for
retail investors).
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II. THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance is generally understood to concern
the provisions within a corporation that enhance management
accountability to shareholders and reduce the potential for
managerial agency costs.18 Corporate governance (as opposed
to corporate law) focuses on the internal structures of the
corporation and on firm-specific choices among legally
permissible structures.19 Common elements of corporate
governance include board size and composition, shareholder
rights and the balance of power between shareholders and
directors, and, in some jurisdictions, the role of nonshareholder stakeholders.20 A variety of specific provisions
fall within this general framework, such as the proportion of
independent directors on the board, whether the board is
classified or subject to election annually, and the ability of
shareholders to influence board composition and corporate
operations through the power to nominate director

18 See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate
Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 740–41 (1997) (explaining that corporate
governance seeks to answer the question: “[H]ow can financiers be sure
that, once they sink their funds [into a firm], they get anything but a
worthless piece of paper back from the manager?”); Edward B. Rock,
America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate Governance, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 367, 389 (1996) (describing a common focus of corporate
governance as “the question of how we can make managers sufficiently
accountable so that they will manage the corporation for the shareholders”).
19 See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46
(Mike Wright, Donald S. Siegel, Kevin Keasey & Igor Filatotchev eds., 2013)
(detailing the evolution and usage of the term “corporate governance”).
20 See generally id. For a broad discussion of corporate governance
principles and an effort to “identify the key building blocks for a sound
corporate governance framework,” see ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV.,
G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7–11 (2015),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264236882en.pdf?expires=1617805953&id=id&accname=ocid177456&checksum=951
917299644D4B2329CEC0E7D2246C3 [https://perma.cc/F3S3-B73N].
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candidates, call special meetings, and act through written
consents.21
The question of what constitutes “good corporate
governance” is polarizing. Many large institutional investors
support governance mechanisms that increase managerial
accountability to shareholders and characterize mechanisms
that insulate management from shareholder interference as
entrenchment.22 Accordingly, institutional investors, proxy
advisory firms, and other participants in corporate
governance debates have developed guidelines of corporate
governance practices that emphasize shareholder power.23
Other commentators argue that the emphasis on shareholder
democracy sacrifices managerial discretion and creates the
risk of shareholder opportunism.24 In addition, some
commentators challenge the notion that a standard set of good
governance practices exists, arguing instead for firm-specific
governance structures tailored to each firm’s idiosyncratic
needs and characteristics.25
In an effort to provide empirical support for the competing
calls for regulatory reform or issuer freedom, scholars have
sought to evaluate the impact of corporate governance both on

21 See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 20, at 21–23
(discussing these provisions).
22 See generally Fisch et al., supra note 7 (detailing the attempts of
institutional investors to improve corporate governance).
23 See, e.g., COUNCIL OF INST. INVS., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POLICIES
5–7
(2017),
https://www.cii.org/files/policies/09_15_17_corp_gov_
policies.pdf [https://perma.cc/2PVB-5UGD].
24 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003) (“[T]he
board of directors is not a mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a
sort of Platonic guardian serving as the nexus of the various contracts
making up the corporation.”).
25 See, e.g., Martin Lipton, One Size Does Not Fit All, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Oct. 16, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu
/2019/10/16/one-size-does-not-fit-all/
[https://perma.cc/8GQM-X4G9]
(endorsing “the ringing truth of the oft heard ‘one size doesn’t fit all’
criticism of the stylized corporate governance principles promulgated by
organizations like Institutional Shareholder Services, Glass Lewis, Council
of Institutional Investors and many major institutional investors”).
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overall economic performance26 and on more specific issues
such as a firm’s investment in research and development,27
and the likelihood that a firm will be involved in financial
fraud or other misconduct.28 Hundreds of such studies have
attempted to assess the value of governance provisions such
as independent boards,29 takeover defenses,30 and Delaware
incorporation.31
Despite the extensive effort that has gone into empirical
analyses, there is limited consensus on the desirability of most
corporate governance provisions.32
On the most hotly
26 See, e.g., generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The NonCorrelation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm
Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002) (attempting to evaluate the effect of
board independence on firm financial performance); Ryan Krause, Matthew
Semadeni & Albert A. Cannella, Jr., CEO Duality: A Review and Research
Agenda, 40 J. MGMT. 256 (2014) (reviewing empirical work on the effect of
separating the positions of CEO and chairman of the board).
27 See, e.g., generally Diego Asensio-López, Laura Cabeza-García &
Nuria González-Álvarez, Corporate Governance and Innovation: A
Theoretical Review, 28 EUR. J. MGMT. & BUS. ECON. 266 (2019) (reviewing
empirical literature analyzing the relationship between corporate
governance and innovation).
28 See, e.g., generally Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the
Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and Financial
Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443 (1996); Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas
J. Skinner, Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting
Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 235 (2000).
29 See, e.g., generally Bhagat & Black, supra note 26.
30 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan
Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889–92 (2002); Lucian
Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783, 823 (2009).
31 See, e.g., Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value, 62
J. FIN. ECON. 525, 553 (2001) (finding Delaware corporations to be worth
more than comparable firms incorporated in other states); Guhan
Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32,
41–43 (2004) (reporting that Daines’s findings did not persist over time).
32 See Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven
Davidoff Solomon, How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case of the
Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 657 (2016) (“Corporate governance
research has . . . focused on the empirical question of whether and how
particular governance terms are priced as a necessary first step in
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contested issues, scholars reach conflicting results. On the
question of whether a staggered board of directors affects firm
value, for example, one group of scholars has consistently
argued that staggered boards reduce value.33 A second group
finds the opposite—that staggered boards increase the value
of at least some firms.34 A third set of scholars critiques both
groups’ studies and concludes that the effect of a staggered
board is idiosyncratic and firm-specific.35
Similarly, the empirical evidence on the economic impact
of dual class voting structures is mixed. A number of studies
have shown that dual class stock enhances agency costs and
reduces returns.36 The challenge is that these were studies of
older dual class firms such as media companies.37 Newer
studies that focus on technology firms have found that, at
least in some cases, dual class firms outperform firms with

answering whether particular governance provisions are good or bad.
Unfortunately, whether and how the market prices corporate governance
remains subject to dispute, as a review of the recent literature shows.”).
33 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards,
78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 410–11 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Cohen,
Entrenched Boards]; see also supra note 30.
34 K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe,
Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON.
422, 424 (2017); David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal & Daniel J. Taylor,
The Market Reaction to Corporate Governance Regulation, 101 J. FIN. ECON.
431, 433 (2011); cf. also Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, Thirty Years of
Shareholder Rights and Firm Value, 69 J. FIN. 1167, 1186 (2014) (finding
different effects in different periods).
35 Yakov Amihud, Markus Schmid & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Settling
the Staggered Board Debate, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1475, 1505 (2018).
36 Ronald W. Masulis, Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Agency Problems at DualClass Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697, 1722 (2009) (finding that dual class stock
is associated with increased agency costs and reduced market value to
minority shareholders); Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick,
Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States,
23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051, 1084–85 (2010) (reporting that
dual
class
companies were associated with higher agency costs and lower firm value).
37 Both the Gompers et al. and Masulis et al. studies are based on the
same sample of U.S. firms from 1994 to 2002. See Masulis et al., supra note
36, at 1700, 1717 & n.22 (describing the sample).
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one share/one vote structures.38 Studies also provide support
for the proposition that the economic value of a dual class
structure evaporates over time, although these studies
document confounding factors such as a decline in the
economic stake and involvement of the founder.39 These
findings reinforce the notion that dual class structures allow
founders to focus on the long term, but that performance
dissipates as founders sell their stakes or reduce their efforts
to develop the business.
One reason for the failure of empirical analysis
conclusively to resolve the value of governance mechanisms is
that the empirical methodology faces several challenges. For
example, the research design of most studies allow them to
identify correlation, but evidence on causality remains
limited. As one commentator explains, “[e]ven those who have
written extensively on the correlation of governance,
generally or with respect to specific governance factors, with
company performance have largely rejected the existence of a
causal connection.”40
In addition, many studies of corporate governance suffer
from an endogeneity problem. They cannot separate out
whether governance is causing a value increase in the firm or
governance is a proxy for other characteristics which enhance
firm value.41 In other words, it may simply be the case that
well-managed firms have good corporate governance, and that
poorly-managed firms do not. Studies of dual class stock raise
particular concerns about endogeneity.42 An issuer’s decision
to go public with a dual class voting structure may reflect its
superior performance, which makes shareholders willing to
38 See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets,
99 B.U. L. REV. 1057, 1072–75 (2019) (describing empirical studies finding
that dual class forms initially outperform but that this outperformance
dissipates over time).
39 Id.
40 Laura Kabler, Money in the Game: Executing a Governance-Based
Hedge Fund Strategy, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 122 (2006).
41 See, e.g., Amihud et al., supra note 35, at 1501–05 (highlighting this
issue in valuing the adoption or removal of staggered board provisions).
42 See, e.g., Masulis et al., supra note 36, at 1719–20 (acknowledging
and attempting to address the endogeneity problem).
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invest notwithstanding the firm’s voting structure. In other
words, dual class stock may be a result of the issuer’s high
performance rather than the cause of that performance.
Moreover, the growth in dual class companies has occurred
relatively recently, posing challenges in empirically assessing
its long-term effect. It may be that the studies finding impact
of dual class are dependent upon an early crop of technology
outperformers such as Google.43
In addition, it is unclear whether a given governance
provision will affect all issuers the same way. A substantial
percentage of corporate governance studies assume that it
will, examining the effect of a particular corporate governance
provision across all firms and evaluating the effect of that
provision on the average firm.44 Yet this assumption is
problematic. Firms differ substantially along various
dimensions, and the effects of specific governance terms may
be heterogenous as well. Thus, for example, Martijn Cremers,
Lubomir Litov, and Simone Sepe found that, when they
differentiated among firms, the effect of a classified board was
positive for some firms and negative for others.45 Amihud,
Schmid, and Solomon take this approach even further and
find that the staggered board on average has no effect on firm
value, and any measurement is also idiosyncratic.46
These challenges have limited the success of empirical
studies in distinguishing good governance provisions from bad
ones. In the absence of conclusive empirical evidence, much of
the debate over corporate governance measures has become
policy-oriented—based on idiosyncratic preferences of capital
43 Google went public in 2004 with a dual class structure. Google Inc.,
Amendment No. 9 to Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 29–
30 (Aug. 18, 2004).
44 See e.g., Bebchuk & Cohen, Entrenched Boards, supra note 33, at
419–30 (reporting results across all sample firms); Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii
& Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON.
107, 129, 130 tbl.IX (2003) (same).
45 See Cremers et al., supra note 34, at 424 (“Our results suggest that
the role of staggered boards differs across firms in a way that both
[insulation of management and signaling commitment to firm-specific
investors] could play a role.”).
46 See Amihud et al., supra note 35, at 1505–07.
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markets actors and policymakers. Thus, for example,
provisions that increase the power of shareholders relative to
managers are defended in terms of democratic principles and
accountability.47 With this development, normative debate
over certain provisions has become even more fractured. The
example of dual class stock is again emblematic, as reflected,
for example, in a former SEC Commissioner’s statement that
“asking investors to put eternal trust in corporate royalty is
antithetical to our values as Americans.”48 These arguments
have been used in support of banning certain governance
provisions—prohibiting issuers from going public with those
provisions, for example, or barring their securities from being
listed on the stock exchanges.49 Yet, as Dorothy Lund has
observed, “without a consensus about what constitutes good
governance, there is reason to believe that the proliferation of
an unthinking, one-size-fits-all approach to governance will
make many companies worse off.”50

III. SYNTHETIC GOVERNANCE
Synthetic governance offers a capital markets solution to
this conundrum. Rather than relying on regulators to identify
and impose best corporate governance practices, synthetic
47 See, e.g., Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder
Democracy and the Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2071, 2079 (2010) (describing two political theory ways of
conceptualizing shareholder democracy: “a public choice approach and a
civic republican approach”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe
for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 57 (2008) (“[S]hareholder
democracy may enable shareholders to increase their advocacy on behalf of
stakeholders.”).
48 Robert J. Jackson Jr., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Perpetual
Dual-Class Stock: The Case Against Corporate Royalty
(Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/perpetual-dual-classstock-case-againstcorporate-royalty [https://perma.cc/AN3N-RVY4].
49 Indeed, regulations currently impose some such mandates. For
example, the NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements mandate that a
majority of directors be independent. LISTED CO. MANUAL § 303A.01 (N.Y.
Stock Exch. 2021); RULEBOOK § 5605(b)(1) (The Nasdaq Stock Mkt. 2021).
50 Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43
J. CORP. L. 493, 495 (2018).
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governance empowers investors to operationalize their
governance preferences through their investment decisions.
Further, synthetic governance generates the opportunity to
evaluate the relationship of those preferences to stock price
returns.
We first describe how the rise of index investing has
created a vehicle in the securities markets for synthetic
governance. We then explain the governance controversy to
which this Article applies synthetic governance: the debate
over dual class voting structures.

A. Index Investing
As the debate over governance rages in the corporate
world, the rise of index funds has dramatically reformed the
role of the capital markets in disciplining governance choices.
Over the past decade, the percentage of assets invested in the
U.S. equity markets through index funds has doubled—from
seven percent in 2010 to approximately fourteen percent in
2019.51 Because a passive investment strategy is less costly
than active stock-picking, index funds typically charge
investors lower fees than actively-managed mutual funds.52
The growth in index funds has also led, for a variety of
reasons, to a concentration in the asset management
market.53 The “big three”—BlackRock, Vanguard, and State
Street—collectively manage roughly eighty percent of the
51 See Dawn Lim, Index Funds Are the New Kings of Wall Street, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 18, 2019, 5:30 AM) (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/index-funds-are-the-new-kings-ofwall-street-11568799004.
52 See Jill E. Fisch, The Uncertain Stewardship Potential of Index
Funds, in GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES
AND POSSIBILITIES (Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds.,
forthcoming) (manuscript at 110) (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3525355 (“Because they do not rely on
costly firm-specific research, index funds incur lower management costs,
and they pass these reduced costs on to mutual fund investors in the form
of very low fees.”).
53 See Fisch et al., supra note 7, at 26 (noting that index fund sponsors
“enjoy economies of scale which enable them to manage very large pools of
assets at low cost.”).
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index fund market and, as a result of the funds they manage,
own roughly twenty percent of S&P 500 companies.54
Although there are thousands of indexes,55 the vast
majority of assets are invested in funds based on widelyknown and broad-based market indexes. Adriana Robertson
reports that almost $4 trillion in assets are invested in funds
that track the S&P 500, and another almost $800 billion are
invested in funds that track the CRSP U.S. Total Market
index.56 Together these indexes account for approximately
half of the assets invested in index funds.57
A variety of studies have sought to analyze the effect of the
rise in index investing on corporate governance and the
capital markets.58 At a minimum, an index-based investment
strategy limits the ability of index fund managers to discipline
portfolio companies through trading decisions. This issue has
raised particular concern with respect to corporate
governance. Because index funds are compelled to hold the
portfolio companies in the underlying indexes, they cannot
sell companies on the basis of bad governance or invest more
in companies with high quality governance. This has led some
commentators to express concern that growth in index
investing will undermine the ability of the capital markets to
discipline corporate governance through stock prices.59 Other
researchers provide evidence that index investing can
facilitate informed trading for more arbitrage-constrained
micro-cap stocks through the realization of short sales
constraints.60
See Lim, supra note 51.
Cf. Robertson, supra note 9, at 811–12 (reporting 601 distinct
indexes based on U.S. equities).
56 Id. at 816 tbl.4.
57 Id.
58 See, e.g., generally Fisch et al., supra note 7.
59 See, e.g., Vladyslav Sushko & Grant Turner, The Implications of
Passive Investing for Securities Markets, BIS Q. REV., Mar. 2018, at 113, 121
(“A higher share of passive investors could . . . weaken market discipline
and alter the incentives of corporate and sovereign issuers to act in the
interest of investors.”).
60 Byung Hyun Ahn & Panos N. Patatoukas, Identifying the Effect of
Stock Indexing: Impetus or Impediment to Arbitrage and Price Discovery?,
54
55
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Companies frequently go public with dual class voting
structures, staggered boards, and other features that do not
comply with so-called best governance practices.61 When those
companies meet the criteria for inclusion in an index, an index
fund must invest in their shares despite its view that the
company’s performance would be improved by changes in its
governance. Sponsors have complained vociferously about the
fact that they are being forced to invest in companies that lack
the governance scheme the sponsors desire.62
Some have called for regulatory intervention. In response
to Snap’s announcement that it planned to issue non-voting
stock to public investors, commentators urged the SEC to
prohibit or restrict the issuance of non-voting shares.63
Another option is to exclude such companies from listing their
shares on the stock exchanges. In 2018, the Council of
Institutional Investors (CII) filed petitions with the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq encouraging them to
limit the listing of dual class issuers.64 After a debate over

J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2–5)
(on
file
with
the
Columbia
Business
Law
Review),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3525355.
61 See, e.g., Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Dual-Class: The
Consequences of Depriving Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting
Rights, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGUL. (May 17,
2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-theconsequences-of-depriving-institutional-investors-of-corporate-votingrights/ [https://perma.cc/AA35-LSRA] (discussing trend of initial public
offerings with dual class structures).
62 See Ning Chiu, BlackRock Wants Equal Voting Rights but Opposes
Exclusion from Indexes, DAVIS POLK BRIEFING: GOVERNANCE (Oct. 23, 2017),
https://www.briefinggovernance.com/2017/10/blackrock-wants-equalvoting-rights-but-opposes-exclusion-from-indexes/ [https://perma.cc/VK3SW7HC].
63 Madison Marriage, State Street Asks SEC To Block Non-Voting
Shares, FIN. TIMES (June 18, 2017) (on file with the Columbia Business Law
Review), https://www.ft.com/content/9595e5c4-51db-11e7-bfb8-9970093669
69. The SEC had previously attempted to ban Exchanges from listing dual
class stock, but its effort was overturned by the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
64 See Hazel Bradford, Investors Intensify Fight Against Dual-Class
Shares,
PENSIONS
&
INVS.
(Apr.
1,
2019,
1:00
AM),
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whether issuers should be allowed to go public with dual or
multi-class voting structures in which public investors are
only able to purchase low-vote or no-vote stock, some market
participants called upon index providers to exclude dual class
issuers from the most popular indexes.65 In 2017, two leading
index providers—Dow Jones and FTSE Russell, which provide
the indexes tracked by the most popular index funds—agreed,
on a prospective basis, to exclude companies with multi-class
voting structures.66
As Scott Hirst and Kobi Kastiel explain, governance by
exclusion is problematic for broad-based index funds.67 The
exclusion of dual class companies can substantially affect the
composition of such a fund as well as its performance.68
Governance by exclusion imposes unproven assumptions
about the economic impact of particular governance terms on
those who invest in index funds. In addition, index fund
investors who are seeking to invest in the overall market may
not even understand that, as a result of a decision by the index
provider, their portfolio does not contain exposure to an
important segment of the market.69 On these bases,
BlackRock opposed the revision of the indexes, instead
arguing that its index funds should still be permitted to invest
in these companies but that the companies themselves should
eliminate dual class structures.70

https://www.pionline.com/article/20190401/PRINT/190409984/investorsintensify-fight-against-dual-class-shares [https://perma.cc/V3PV-9FXZ].
65 See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate Governance by Index
Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. REV. 1229, 1231–33, 1246–47(2019).
66 Id. at 1232.
67 See id. at 1234.
68 See id. at 1246–47.
69 For example, a dual class exclusion would include companies such as
Google, Facebook, and Pinterest. See Kosmas Papadopoulos, Dual-Class
Shares: Governance Risks and Company Performance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
&
FIN.
REGUL.
(June
28,
2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/28/dual-class-shares-governancerisks-and-company-performance/ (observing that Google, Facebook, and
Pinterest are among the companies with dual class voting structures).
70 See Chiu, supra note 62.
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The challenge of disciplining governance through index
investing results from limitations in the scope of index funds
themselves. As noted above, the vast majority of funds track
a few broad-based indexes such as the S&P 500.71 Index
exclusion, at least in the case of dual class stock, focuses on
whether to exclude companies with a particular governance
feature from those standard indexes.
While most mutual fund assets are concentrated in funds
based on large, well-known indexes, there are a number of
bespoke indexes created at the behest of particular asset
managers to facilitate specific investment strategies. In her
pathbreaking taxonomy of index funds, Adriana Robertson
found that the median index was tracked by only a single
fund.72 Moreover, she found a total of 193 different indexes
that were associated with assets exceeding $1 billion.73
In contrast to the broad-based indexes, bespoke indexes
are highly divergent. Index funds can be used to invest in a
specific industry, to limit investments according to
environmental criteria, or to reflect the investing style of T.
Boone Pickens.74 Although environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) investing differs to a degree from a
governance-based investing strategy, the rise of ESG index
funds provides an illustration of the practicality of the indexbased concept. ESG-based investing is one of fastest-growing
investment categories.75 Large asset managers are offering
investors an increasing number of index fund products that
track various ESG indexes such as the MSCI ESG indexes or
the Dow Jones Sustainability indexes, or that are based on
indexes constructed from ESG ratings such as
71 More than twice as many index funds track the S&P 500 as track
any other index. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 816 tbl.4.
72 Id. at 813.
73 Id. at 814.
74 See Fisch et al., supra note 7, at 30 n.65 (describing the BOON ETF
as pursuing the latter strategy).
75 See, e.g., Greg Iacurci, Money Moving into Environmental Funds
Shatters Previous Record, CNBC (Jan. 14, 2020, 10:54 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/14/esg-funds-see-record-inflows-in2019.html [https://perma.cc/VUU7-NEC5] (describing record inflows into
ESG mutual funds in 2019).
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Sustainalytics.76 In each case, the fund uses an index
constructed on the basis of ESG criteria as the basis for its
investments. For example, Dow Jones offers an S&P 500 ESG
fund that excludes those companies in each industry group
that have the lowest ESG scores based on the S&P DJI ESG
ratings, as well as companies that make tobacco or weapons
or that do not comply with the United Nations Global
Compact.77
Investors can thus use index funds to select or exclude
portfolio companies based on ESG criteria. In other words,
ESG can function as a positive screen—marking companies
that meet designated ESG criteria for inclusion in the index—
or as a negative screen—excluding companies with certain
characteristics from the index. As funds based on these
indexes develop a track record, their performance will provide
valuable information on the relationship beween ESG and
economic performance. ESG indexes can implement broadbased screens or hyper-specific ones. The SPDR SSGA Gender
Diversity Index ranks companies within each sector by three
gender diversity ratios and focuses “on companies with the
highest levels within their sectors of senior leadership gender
diversity.”78 The related ETF had $236.05 million in assets

76 See,
e.g., ESG Indices Passive Funds, SUSTAINALYTICS,
https://www.sustainalytics.com/investor-solutions/index-researchservices/esg-index#:~:text=Sustainalytics'%20ESG%20research
%20is%20used,ESG%20indices%20and%20passive%20vehicles.&text=Sus
tainalytics%20will%20provide%20quarterly%20updates%20on%20the%20
state%20of%20the%20regulations [https://perma.cc/2PMG-EW7Z] (last
visited Apr. 7, 2021) (listing funds using Sustainalytics research); Jess Liu,
Morningstar’s Quintessential List of Sustainable Funds (Apr. 20, 2020) (on
file with the Columbia Business Law Review), https://www.
morningstar.com/articles/977271/morningstars-quintessential-list-ofsustainable-funds (describing various categories of ESG mutual funds).
77 REID STEADMAN & DANIEL PERRONE, S&P GLOB., THE S&P 500® ESG
INDEX: INTEGRATING ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND GOVERNANCE VALUES
INTO THE CORE 2–4 (2019), https://www.spglobal.com/_media/documents
/the-sp-500-esg-index-integrating-esg-values-into-the-core.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WD9U-65W2].
78 SPDR® SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF, STATE ST. GLOB.
ADVISORS (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
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under management as of June 17, 2021, and its three top
holdings were PayPal, Texas Instruments, and Visa.79 In
2020, the ETF returned 17.95% compared to 16.4% for the
S&P 500 Index.80
To date, however, the index market does not appear to
have used governance provisions as a basis for constructing
bespoke indexes.81 There is no obvious reason for this
omission. The major index providers can and do construct
bespoke indexes at the behest of asset managers.82 An index
provider can incorporate any set of rule-based firm selection
https://www.ssga.com/us/en/individual/etfs/funds/spdr-ssga-genderdiversity-index-etf-she (last visited Jun. 18, 2021).
79 Id.
80 Compare SPDR SSGA Gender Diversity Index ETF (SHE)
Performance,
YAHOO!:
FIN.,
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/SHE/
performance/ [https://perma.cc/CK73-7HHJ] (last visited May 31, 2021)
(Gender Diversity Index), with fhorner@sir-inc.com, Dow, S&P 500 Score
Record Closes as 2020 Comes to an End, NASDAQ (Dec. 31, 2020, 4:50 PM),
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/dow-sp-500-score-record-closes-as-2020comes-to-an-end-2020-12-31 [https://perma.cc/2YWP-SMA2] (S&P 500).
81 There have been limited efforts to exploit corporate governance as a
trading strategy outside the ESG context. Perhaps the best known is the
Lens fund, founded by well-known activist Robert Monks, which used a
long/short strategy to exploit differences in corporate governance. See
Hilary Rosenberg, An Activist Shareholder Takes on the World, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 1999 (§ 3), at 8 (describing the Lens Fund). An example of an
actively-managed fund that explicitly discloses its consideration of
governance is the Neuberger Berman Intrinsic Value Fund. See NEUBERGER
BERMAN, NEUBERGER BERMAN INTRINSIC VALUE FUND: SUMMARY PROSPECTUS
2–3 (2020) (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
https://www.nb.com/handlers/documents.ashx?item_id=c9b99343-211242cf-9a17-9ad85ba01522 (“The Portfolio Managers also integrate
governance factors into the investment process. They seek to invest in
companies that have effective and independent boards composed of diverse,
and currently active, CEOs and other C-level executives. They look for
companies where management and shareholder interests are aligned (often
through high ownership of the company by management), with long-term
incentive plans and CEO and management compensation and succession
plans in place.”). We note that an index-based approach offers several
advantages including a more transparent set of governance criteria as well
as the substantially lower costs associated with an index-based investment
vehicle.
82 See Robertson, supra note 9, at 830–31.
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criteria into an index, including governance screens. As a
result, it is possible to create an index comprised solely of
companies with dual class voting structures or to construct a
dual-free S&P 500 index. Similarly, it is possible to construct
an index that extends beyond the exclusion of dual class
structures and that excludes companies with other “bad”
governance provisions such as staggered boards, combined
chairman and CEO positions, plurality voting, excessive
restrictions on shareholder ability to call a special meeting, or
any other governance features.
Governance-based index funds thus could provide
investors with access to synthetic governance—the ability to
select their portfolio companies on the basis of governance
criteria. The utility of such funds is manifold. First, they
provide a solution to the inability of index funds to exercise
market discipline by selling the stock of companies with bad
corporate governance. Because an asset manager can offer a
“good governance” fund in which governance is an investment
criterion, asset flows into that fund will have the effect of
reducing the cost of capital for the fund’s portfolio companies.
Second, governance funds offer a market-based
mechanism to evaluate empirically the effect of corporate
governance. If, as many large institutional investors claim,
certain bad governance features are value-decreasing, good
governance funds should outperform their broad-based peers
and attract inflows from investors.83
Finally, synthetic governance provides a mechanism to
enhance management accountability by providing passive
investors a way to subject the governance choices of their
portfolio companies to capital market discipline. There are

83 Mutual fund asset flows respond to fund performance. See, e.g.,
Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in
Equilibrium, 9 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 147, 148 (2017) (“[F]und flows into
mutual funds are known to be highly predictable on the basis of past
performance[.]”); C. Wei Li, Ashish Tiwari & Lin Tong, Investment Decisions
Under Ambiguity: Evidence from Mutual Fund Investor Behavior, 63 MGMT.
SCI. 2509, 2523 (2017) (“One of the most well-known findings in the mutual
fund literature is the convex relationship between investor flows and past
fund performance.”).
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also systemic effects: if bespoke governance indexes are
successful in attracting investor assets, firms may adopt
specific governance practices to qualify for inclusion. To be
sure, this may dilute the extent to which performance of these
indexes reflects firm characteristics that are independent of
the governance mechanism, but we see this effect as a
valuable feature of synthetic governance in that synthetic
governance will generate not just capital flows but also firmspecific governance reforms when the market demonstrates
the value of particular governance mechanisms.
Given the range of indexes and related ETFs, it is apparent
that there is demand and a market structure to support the
use of bespoke indexes to implement synthetic governance.
Mutual funds structured in accordance with these indexes
would allow investors to select for their preferred governance
characteristics.
We theorize that fund flows into governance mutual funds
would be based on the characteristics that drive fund flows
elsewhere—mainly excess return. In this regard we do not
view a governance index as a sector index likely to generate
idiosyncratic or undiversified performance. A governance
index would instead operate as a general market index akin
to the S&P 500 or Russell 3000. Consequently, the benchmark
for such an index would be these broader market indexes.84
The development of governance indexes would allow
investors to address the selection and endogeneity problems
of empirical studies. A firm’s governance provisions would be
evaluated by comparing the performance of the governance
fund to the broader market (or, in some cases, the relevant
sector). Governance indexes could include or exclude
companies based on their use of one or multiple governance
provisions. In this regard, synthetic governance is no different
than any index—it implements a rule-based approach to stock
selection, with specific governance provisions constituting the
applicable rules. By providing a simple and low-cost
investment strategy based on governance provisions,
84 We note that this proposition would not hold to the extent that
particular governance provisions are disproportionately associated with a
particular industry sector.
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synthetic governance will allow capital flows to select which
governance features are value-increasing. As such, it is a
market-based alternative to regulation—a tool for enhancing
the market discipline of firm-specific governance choices.
Two of us have theorized that index fund engagement can
ameliorate systemic risk issues.85 To the extent this theory is
true, a bespoke governance ETF may also draw capital looking
to hedge against the systemic risks addressed by specific
governance provisions. As a result, certain governance index
strategies may attract capital even if they lag the S&P 500 or
other major indexes.

B. The Dual Class Controversy
Few governance provisions have generated as much
controversy as dual class voting structures. In a company with
dual class stock, all the shares of common stock have equal
economic rights, but some shares, termed high-vote shares,
have more voting rights than the others, which are termed
low-vote shares.86 The typical ratio is ten votes to one,87
although in the extreme case, exemplified by Snap, the shares
sold to public shareholders have no voting rights at all.88
Founders and, sometimes, other early stage investors
See Fisch et al., supra note 7, at 25–26.
See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 38, at 1064 (“Dual class stock refers
to a capital structure in which shares of an issuer’s common stock with equal
economic rights differ with respect to their relative voting power. The
common stock in a dual class company is divided into two or more classes,
in which the shares with more voting power are typically described as high
vote stock, and the shares with less voting power are described as low vote
stock.” (footnote omitted)).
87 See COUNCIL OF INST. INVS., Dual-Class Stock, https://www.cii
.org/dualclass_stock [https://perma.cc/FD78-LCTU] (last visited May 31,
2021) (“The per-share voting power disparity most typically employed is
10/1[.]”).
88 See Eleanor Bloxham, Snap Shouldn’t Have Been Allowed To Go
Public Without Voting Rights, FORTUNE (Mar. 3, 2017, 3:18 PM),
http://fortune.com/2017/03/03/snap-ipo-non-voting-stock/
[https://perma.cc/9LFU-FYYV] (explaining that, “[a]t Snap (SNAP), only
pre-IPO investors who own private shares will be able to vote on company
matters”).
85
86
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typically hold high-vote shares, while low-vote shares are sold
to public investors.89 Dual class stock thus enables a founder
to retain control while holding an investment that reflects less
than a majority of the firm’s economic value.90 In some cases
the divergence can be stark, with the founder or other
controllers maintaining control of the company with ten
percent or less of the economic value.91
Dual class voting structures have existed for decades, and
firms using dual class structures historically tended to be
media companies, family businesses, and insider-controlled
businesses.92 Ford Motor Company used a dual class structure
in its 1956 IPO to maintain control of the company within the
Ford family.93 The New York Times has a dual class
89 See Ken Bertsch, Snap and the Rise of No-Vote Common Shares,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (May 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.
harvard.edu/2017/05/26/snap-and-the-rise-of-no-vote-common-shares/
[https://perma.cc/4B2P-9J38] (“With NYSE-listed Snap’s arrival with ‘zero’
rights for public shareholders, perhaps the bottom has been reached.”); Eric
Jhonsa, Zillow Plans To Issue Non-Voting Class C Shares, SEEKING ALPHA
(July 21, 2015, 9:54 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/news/2643935-zillowplans-to-issue-non-voting-class-c-shares
[https://perma.cc/T8NV-FK7J]
(reporting that Zillow created “Class C shares that carry no voting rights”);
Floyd Norris, The Many Classes of Google Stock, N.Y. TIMES: ECONOMIX
(Apr. 2, 2014, 6:03 PM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/02/themany-classes-of-google-stock/ [https://perma.cc/89RK-JJL4] (describing the
issuance of Class C shares in Google that “have no voting rights”).
90 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 38, at 1065.
91 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 VA. L. REV. 585, 620 (2017).
92 David J. Berger & Laurie Simon Hodrick, Are Dual-Class Companies
Harmful to Stockholders? A Preliminary Review of the Evidence, HARV. L.
SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REGUL. (Apr. 15, 2018),
http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/15/are-dual-class-companiesharmful-to-stockholders-a-preliminary-review-of-the-evidence/
[https://perma.cc/24VN-9V8Z] (explaining that, although “[d]ual class
companies have existed for nearly a century . . . ., most dual-class
companies were family businesses, media companies seeking to ensure their
publications could maintain journalistic editorial independence, or other
companies led by a strong group of insiders”).
93 See J.A. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 166–77 (J.B.
Lippincott Co. 1958) (detailing the background to the IPO of Ford Motor
Company and its use of dual class stock).
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structure.94 The justification for dual class structures was
that they permitted a founding family or other controller to
maintain a unique business, such as a newspaper operation,
which needed to be isolated from market forces or otherwise
run in the interests of stakeholders other than shareholders.95
While dual class stock may assist firms in meeting these other
stakeholder interests, studies suggest that dual class
structures at these firms were also associated with higher
agency costs, limited minority shareholder rights, and inferior
economic performance.96
Starting with the Google IPO in 2004, dual class voting
structures increased in popularity and migrated to the
technology sector.97 In recent years, approximately twentytwo percent of U.S. technology companies have gone public
with a dual class structure.98 Although historically dual class
companies have comprised a small percentage of the major
stock market indexes, they now represent roughly nine
percent of the S&P 100 by market capitalization.99 And with
the rise of dual class stock in technology firms, firms in other
industries have felt more willing to adopt dual class voting
94

The N.Y. Times Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 106 (Feb. 25,

2021).
95 See Gerald F. Davis, What Might Replace the Modern Corporation?
Uberization and the Web Page Enterprise, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 501, 505–
06 (2016).
96 See, e.g., Gompers et al., supra note 36, at 1084–85; Masulis et al.,
supra note 36, at 1722.
97 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 38, at 1067–70 (detailing the
resurgence of dual class stock in technology companies after the Google
IPO).
98 See George F. Schoen & Keith Hallam, Dual-Class Share Structures
in the United States, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2020, at 1, 2 (2020)
(Sabastian V. Niles & Adam O. Emmerich eds., 13th ed. 2020),
https://www.cravath.com/a/web/13094/CG20_Chapter%201%20%20Cravath,%20Swaine%20and%20Moore-B.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UQJBT9M] (finding that a yearly average of 22.6% of technology company IPOs
from 2010 through 2019 featured dual class structures).
99 Charles M. Elson & Craig K. Ferrere, Unequal Voting and the
Business Judgment Rule, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOV. (Apr. 7, 2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/04/07/unequal-voting-and-thebusiness-judgment-rule/ [https://perma.cc/K3AD-7PYQ].
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structures. For example, Shake Shack, which sells
hamburgers, has gone public with dual class stock,100 as has
Chewy, which sells pet goods online.101
Shareholders have objected to the spread of dual class
structures on many grounds. First, they have complained
about disenfranchisement and the lack of appropriate
shareholder voice in the corporate enterprise.102 Because dual
class stock provides control to one or a small group of
individuals, ordinary shareholders are unable to elect
directors or, if things go awry, remove directors. Second, the
structure of dual class stock creates a potential gap between a
controller’s economic interest and the controller’s voting
interest, a gap that Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel have
termed the “wedge.”103 This gap creates increased incentives
for self-dealing by the controller.104 The theoretical potential
for self-dealing finds some real world support. Viacom, for
example, was notorious for continuing to pay its controller
Sumner Redstone tens of millions of dollars each year despite
his incapacitation.105
100 See Jeff Green & Carol Hymowitz, Let Them Eat Burgers,
BLOOMBERG (on file with the Columbia Business Law Review),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-05/shake-shack-iposoars-shareholder-democracy-be-damned (last updated Feb. 6, 2015, 11:22
AM).
101 See Kevin Curran, Chewy’s Dual-Class Structure Isn’t Ideal for
Investors,
THESTREET
(June
14,
2019,
11:26
AM),
https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/chewy-s-dual-classstructure-isn-t-ideal-for-investors-14992086
[https://perma.cc/GU5NBT7V].
102 See Dual-Class Stock, supra note 87 (“CII’s policies endorse the
principle of ‘one share, one vote’: every share of a public company’s common
stock should have equal voting rights.” (emphasis omitted)).
103 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Perils of Small-Minority
Controllers, 107 GEO. L.J. 1453, 1461 (2019) (defining the wedge as “the gap
between the controller’s fraction of voting rights and fraction of equity
capital”).
104 See id. at 1468–71 (modeling the increased potential for self-dealing
as the size of the wedge increases).
105 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91, at 587–88 (discussing the
ninety-three-year-old Redstone’s refusal to give up control despite “profound
physical and mental illness” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
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There are other concerns. As a practical matter, dual class
structure is also one of the most powerful antitakeover
devices,106 insulating dual class companies from the discipline
of the takeover market.107 Relatedly, dual class stock also
insulates management from activist shareholders who might
agitate for change at the company.108 Additionally,
commentators have raised the idea that it is unfair or
undemocratic for some shareholders to have disproportionate
voting rights.109 And, ultimately, dual class stock can vest
perpetual control in the hands of one person long after that
control is appropriate.110
The criticism of dual class structures has grown more
strident with the rise of institutional investors. Dual class
stock tempers the power of these stockholders, shifting it back
to the founder. Many institutional investors have responded
by calling for regulatory limits on companies with dual class

Emily Steel, Viacom Chiefs Take Trust Battle to Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 24,
2016, at B1)); Emily Steel, Viacom Board Said To End Salary for Sumner
Redstone, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2016) (on file with the Columbia Business
Law Review), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/19/business/media/viacomboard-said-to-end-salary-for-sumner-redstone.html (discussing Redstone’s
compensation).
106 Gompers et al., supra note 36, at 1052 (describing dual class stock
as the most extreme example of antitakeover protection).
107 See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters
Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 83, 116–17 (2001) (“The most restrictive [antitakeover protection] is
either dual-class or a staggered board combined with prohibitions on voting
by written consent and prohibitions on shareholders calling a special
meeting.”).
108 See Kobi Kastiel, Against All Odds: Hedge Fund Activism in
Controlled Companies, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 60, 93–95 (observing
variations in the effect depending on the type of dual class structure used
by a company).
109 See, e.g., Kara M. Stein., Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Mutualism: Reimagining the Role of Shareholders in Modern Corporate
Governance (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-stein021318 [https://perma.cc/3YPG-C8C3] (stating that dual class structures
are “inherently undemocratic, disconnecting the interests of a company’s
controlling shareholders from its other shareholders”).
110 See Bebchuk & Kastiel, supra note 91, at 590.
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structures.111 The CII, for example, explains that “the ‘one
share, one vote’ principle has been a core focus for CII since
its founding in the 1980s,”112 and the group has actively
campaigned against dual class structures.113 Despite the
limited success of institutions in persuading some index
providers to exclude dual class companies from their
indexes,114 to date neither the SEC nor the stock exchanges
appear willing to prohibit dual class structures. In the absence
of regulation, issuers continue to go public with dual class
voting structures.115
This impasse has led commentators to shift to a
compromise position: the mandatory sunset. They argue that,
if a company goes public with a dual class voting structure,
that structure should terminate automatically a designated
number of years after the IPO.116 The justification for sunset
provisions is based on the proposition that any value that a
111 See Bradford, supra note 64 (describing the CII’s petitions to the
NYSE and Nasdaq, which were supported by BlackRock and T. Rowe Price).
The SEC attempted to prohibit the NYSE from amending its listing
requirements to permit dual class companies, but its effort was invalidated
by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406,
407 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
112 Dual-Class Stock, supra note 87.
113 Id.
114 See Hirst & Kastiel, supra note 65, at 1266.
115 Warner Music Group, for example, recently went public, raising
$1.925 billion utilizing dual class stock with the high-vote stock having
twenty votes per share. See Warner Music Grp. Corp., Amendment No. 2 to
Form S-1 Registration Statement (Form S-1/A), at 15 (May 26, 2020) (“Upon
completion of this offering, we will have two classes of voting common stock,
Class A common stock and Class B common stock. Each share of Class A
common stock is entitled to one vote per share and each share of Class B
common stock is entitled to 20 votes per share.”); Press Release, Warner
Music Grp., Warner Music Group Corp. Announces Pricing of Initial Public
Offering (June 3, 2020), https://www.wmg.com/news/warner -music-groupcorp-announces-pricing-initial-public-offering-34826
[https://perma.cc/8D9V-T2TK] (reporting the offering price).
116 See, e.g., Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical
and Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 852, 870 (describing time-based sunsets as “presumably what
most institutional investors and proxy advisors are referring to when they
insist that dual-class companies must adopt reasonable sunset provisions”).
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dual class structure provides by insulating the founders of
newly-public companies from shareholder interference likely
dissipates over time. Eventually, the benefits of the dual class
structure decline to the point where they are outweighed by
the associated agency costs of the dual class structure. The
CII, although continuing to prefer unitary voting structures
has, since 2016, supported a seven-year sunset as “[a] credible
path to alignment.”117 SEC Investor Advocate Rick Fleming
has urged the stock exchanges to require the sunsetting of
“super-voting rights.”118 To date, though, no governmental
regulation appears to be imminent.

IV. THE DUAL INDEX—A CASE STUDY OF
SYNTHETIC GOVERNANCE
The Dual Index is a bespoke index of dual class companies
conceived and developed by one of the co-authors of this
paper.119 The objective of the Dual Index is to target those
dual class companies for which, according to the existing
empirical literature, the net benefits of the dual class
structure are most likely to be positive. It does so in two steps:
first, by selecting dual class companies, and second, by
creating a synthetic time-based sunset provision to exclude
the stock of companies that retain a dual class structure a
designated number of years after the company’s IPO. The
Dual-Class Stock, supra note 87 (emphasis omitted).
Rick Fleming, Inv. Advoc., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Dual-Class
Shares: A Recipe for Disaster (Oct. 15, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/
news/speech/fleming-dual-class-shares-recipe-disaster#_edn8
[https://perma.cc/9KNN-CK5S].
119 A version of the Dual Index is licensed to an ETF issuer under the
name North Shore Dual Share Class Index. See About Us, N. SHORE INDICES,
https://www.northshoreindices.com/ [https://perma.cc/MT2Q-LMPF] (last
visited Apr. 8, 2021); N. SHORE INDICES, DUALSX: NORTH SHORE DUAL
SHARE CLASS INDEX 1 (2019), https://ab72e310-eadb-4d77-877d1432cd571de5.filesusr.com/ugd/849193_1263b717587241b8acdd7b6b75697
e81.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZXT-SRRM] (describing the index). The Index is
designed to track the performance of dual-class companies incorporated in
the United States. The calculator of this index is Indxx. North Shore Dual
Share Class Index, INDXX, https://www.indxx.com/north-shore-dual-shareclass-index-tr [https://perma.cc/N2C7-5VUV] (last visited May 31, 2021).
117
118
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Dual Index thus provides a model of how to create a
customized governance regime through synthetic governance.
In the following sections, we provide the details of the Dual
Index’s construction and report our tests of its performance.

A. Dual Index Construction
Figure 1 illustrates the rise to prominence of dual class
companies over the last decade. The total market value of dual
class companies has increased by five times: from $700 billion
in June 2009 to $3.8 trillion in December 2019. As of the
December 2019 index reconstitution, the value of dual class
companies represented more than ten percent of the market
capitalization of the entire Russell 3000 index.120
Figure 1
Market Cap of Dual Class Companies ($TN)
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$4.0
$3.5

$3.5
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To develop the Dual Index, we collect data from the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) as well as the
Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database and
120 See FTSE RUSSELL, 2020 RUSSELL US INDEXES RECONSTITUTION 1
(2020), https://content.ftserussell.com/sites/default/files/russell_us_indexes
_recon_2020_recap_6.26.2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/263A-3DH6] (giving a
total Russell 3000 market capitalization of $31.4 trillion as of May 2020).
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follow a biannual reconstitution process.121 At the end of June
and December each year, we compile a list of dual class
companies with ordinary common shares listed on NYSE,
Nasdaq, or NYSE American and total market capitalization
in excess of $100 million.
From this subset, we initially select for inclusion those
dual class companies whose firm age as a public company (the
time elapsed since their IPO) ranges from six months to
twenty years. Since most IPOs have six-month lockups that
can influence both price and volatility,122 our portfolio
excludes IPOs prior to the expiration of that lockup. The
twenty-year filter retains all companies that went public after
the Google IPO in 2004.123 As a result, the Dual Index
effectively eliminates the prior generation of dual class
companies—the family owned and media companies that are
the focus of some earlier empirical studies of dual class
stock.124 The twenty-year filter is sufficiently long that it does
not impose a synthetic sunset—an issue that we address later;
instead, a twenty-year window is of sufficient length that it
addresses the issues two of us raised in The Problem of
Sunsets: namely that a fixed time horizon is arbitrary and
appears contrary to the purpose of a sunset, which is to end
the dual class structure when it is no longer useful to
implement the founder’s visionary mission.125

121 On these data, see Research Data, CTR. FOR RSCH. IN SEC. PRICES,
http://www.crsp.org/products/research-products [https://perma.cc/NW8RRKS3] (last visited May 31, 2021) (CRSP data); SDC® Platinum, REFINITIV,
https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/sdc-platinum-financial-securities
[https://perma.cc/F8KL-CVCH] (last visited May 31, 2021) (SDC Platinum
data).
122 See, e.g., James C. Brau, David A. Carter, Stephen E. Christophe &
Kimberly G. Key, Market Reaction to the Expiration of IPO Lockup
Provisions, 30 MANAGERIAL FIN. 75, 83 (2003) (reporting statistically
significant negative abnormal returns in the event window surrounding the
expiration date of the lockup).
123 See generally Google Inc., supra note 43 (giving the 2004 date of
Google’s IPO).
124 See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
125 See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 38, at 1080–83.
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In case of a delisting or the collapse of the dual class
structure, we reinvest the proceeds in the market portfolio
until the next Dual Index reconstitution. Our back-testing
period is from June 2009 to December 2019, which is the most
recent date on which we reconstituted the Dual Index.

B. Dual Index Characteristics
As of the December 2019 reconstitution, the Dual Index
included 178 dual class companies valued in total at $3.4
trillion. The Index includes eighty-nine percent of the market
capitalization of all dual class companies listed across major
U.S. stock exchanges.
With respect to the distribution of index weights across
sectors, Table 1 shows that as of December 2019, the most
heavily weighted sectors are Communication Services (38.8%)
and Information Technology (33.7%), followed by Financials
(9.4%), Consumer Discretionary (4.9%), and Health Care
(4.4%). Focusing on these sectors, the top portfolio holdings
include,
Facebook
(Communication
Services),
Visa
(Information Technology), CME Group (Financials),
Lululemon Athletica (Consumer Discretionary), and Zoetis
(Health Care).
Table 1 also demonstrates how the sector representation
within the Dual Index has evolved over time. In particular,
the prominence of dual class companies in the Communication
Services and Information Technology sector has increased,
and the relative index weights of dual class companies in the
Industrials sector has declined.
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Table 1
Dual Index Sector Weights
June
December
GICS Sector
2009
2019
Communication
23.4%
38.8%
Services
Information
20.9%
33.7%
Technology
Financials
15.8%
9.4%
Consumer
8.1%
4.9%
Discretionary
Health Care
5.8%
4.4%
Consumer Staples
9.2%
3.5%
Industrials
13.5%
2.7%
Real Estate
0.8%
0.9%
Energy
0.8%
0.8%
Materials
1.8%
0.7%
Utilities
0.0%
0.3%

Average
29.2%
26.1%
13.4%
6.8%
3.8%
7.9%
10.1%
1.0%
0.5%
1.2%
0.1%

Table 2 compares the Dual Index constituents to the
general population of companies along several dimensions of
corporate governance. The evidence shows that the dual class
structure overlaps with other provisions that may inhibit
management accountability to shareholders and increase
agency costs—that is, other provisions typically characterized
as “bad” governance. To illustrate, dual class companies are
significantly less likely to separate the CEO and board chair
positions.126 The frequency of dual class companies with
combined CEO-chair roles is 42% compared to 32% for the
general population. Dual class companies are less likely to
require majority voting to elect their board (26% versus
42%).127 Dual class companies are also slightly less likely to

126 For a discussion of separating the CEO and chair positions, see
Yaron Nili, Successor CEOs, 99 B.U. L. REV. 787, 805–16 (2019).
127 For an explanation of majority versus plurality voting, see Stephen
J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority
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have a majority of independent board directors (83% versus
88%)128 and less likely to have a majority voting director
resignation policy (30% versus 48%).129
Table 2
Corporate Governance Characteristics
Dual
Non-Dual
Dif.
Variables
Stocks
Stocks
I(Dual CEO Chair)
42%
32%
10%***
I(Majority Vote to Elect
Board)
26%
42%
-16%***
I(Majority Board Being
Independent)
83%
88%
-5%*
I(Director Resignation Policy)
30%
48%
-18%***
I(Poison Pill Policy)
1%
3%
-2%***
I(Supermajority Vote Merger)
7%
17%
-10%***
I(Shareholders Special
Meeting Rights)
39%
46%
-7%**
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests.

With respect to other corporate governance dimensions,
dual class companies are less likely to have a poison pill policy
under which the company needs to obtain stockholder
approval before adopting a poison pill (1% versus 3%) and are
less likely to require supermajority voting for mergers (7%
versus 17%). This last provision makes it difficult for an
acquirer to collect the affirmative votes of enough
shareholders to approve a merger transaction or even
Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1124–29
(2016).
128 Recall that Nasdaq and the NYSE require a majority of directors to
be independent. See supra note 49.
129 A director resignation policy requires any directors who receive
more withheld ballots than votes for their election to tender their
resignation to the board. The board will then decide whether it will accept
the resignation. See Choi et al., supra note 127, at 1125–6 (explaining
director resignation policies).
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impossible if insiders hold enough shares to prevent the
acquirer from obtaining the required vote. Lastly, dual class
companies are less likely to provide shareholders with the
power to call a special meeting (39% versus 46% ).

C. Back-Testing Results
Next, we evaluate the historical track record of the Dual
Index. Table 3 presents the results over the 126 months from
June 2009 to December 2019. We construct the valueweighted market index, including distributions, using the
CRSP universe of common stocks.
Over the back-testing period, the Dual Index earned an
annual return of 19.23% with a standard deviation of 14.39%,
while the CRSP market index earned an annual return of
14.98% with a standard deviation of 12.98%. The Dual Index
performance corresponds to a monthly multi-factor alpha of
thirty-one basis points. In terms of factor loadings, the Dual
Index has (1) positive loadings on the market and momentum
factors, (2) negative loadings on the size and investment
factors, and (3) insignificant loadings on the value and
profitability factors.
Table 3
Dual Index Performance (June 2009 to December 2019)
Dual
Market Market
Mimic
Index
Index
ex Dual
Index
Monthly Return
1.60%
1.25%
1.23%
1.32%
Monthly Volatility
4.15%
3.75%
3.75%
3.78%
Annual Return
19.23% 14.98% 14.72% 15.89%
Annual Volatility
14.39% 12.98% 12.99% 13.10%
Cum. Growth of $1
$6.68
$4.38
$4.26
$4.81

Table 3 also compares the Dual Index to two other
benchmarks. First, in the third column, it compares the Dual
Index to the market with dual class companies excluded. The
third column thus demonstrates the economic impact of
excluding issuers with dual class stock in accordance with the
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approach recently adopted by some index providers.130 As the
column indicates, excluding dual class has little effect on
performance relative to the market as a whole.
Second, in response to the fact that dual class voting
structures are concentrated in the technology sector,131 and to
isolate the sectoral component of the Dual Index, we construct
a portfolio of non-dual-class companies with identical sector
weights to those of the Dual Index. In essence, the mimicking
index (Mimic Index) replicates the sectoral exposure of the
Dual Index using non-dual-class companies. This index thus
addresses concerns that the results of the Dual Index are
driven solely by outperformance of technology firms.
Table 3 shows that over the back-testing period the Mimic
Index earned an annual return of 15.89% with a standard
deviation of 13.10%, while the Dual Index earned an annual
return of 19.23% with a standard deviation of 14.39%. Figure
2 also shows that a one-dollar investment in the Mimic Index
would have grown to $4.81 between June 2009 and December
2019. Over the same time, a one-dollar investment in the Dual
Index would have grown to $6.68. While the Mimic Index
outperforms the market index over the back-testing period, it
does not fully account for the outperformance of the Dual
Index. Stated otherwise, the performance of the Dual Index
does not simply capture the sectoral performance of dual class
constituents. One implication is that there is a firm-specific
component to the dual class share structure choice that goes
beyond sectoral variation.
Figure 2 plots the cumulative growth of a one-dollar
investment in the Dual Index (green line) relative to the
cumulative growth of a one-dollar investment in the market
index (blue line). The evidence shows that a one-dollar
investment in the Dual Index would have grown to $6.68
between June 2009 and December 2019. Over the same time,
a one-dollar investment in the market index would have
grown to $4.38. Figure 2 also shows that the outperformance
of the Dual Index is especially pronounced in the second half

130
131

See Fisch & Solomon, supra note 38, at 1076.
See supra Section IV.B tbl.1.
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of our back-testing period, which is consistent with the rise in
prominence of dual class companies.
Figure 2
Cumulative Growth of $1 Investment
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We note that the spread in the realized performance of the
Dual Index relative to the overall market portfolio may
understate the outperformance of dual class companies. This
is because the overall market index performance, especially
over the last decade, is partially attributable to the rise of dual
class companies. Going forward, major indexes will either
exclude or underweight dual class companies. As a result,
index investors will no longer be able to access the growth of
these companies through their index holdings. Indeed, over
the back-testing period a one-dollar investment in the market
index excluding Dual Index stocks would have grown to $4.26,
which is slightly below the performance of the market index
including Dual Index stocks.

D. The Effect of Sunset Lengths
The Dual Index does not merely enable us to capture the
effect of an investment strategy based on whether a firm
utilizes a dual class voting structure; it allows us to go further
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and test the effect of a time-based sunset. We do this by
shortening the length of time a company remains in our index
following its IPO. By excluding dual class companies a
designated number of years after the IPO we are, in effect,
creating a synthetic sunset.
Part of the value of this approach is that it sheds light on
the time period that is necessary to allow founders to fulfill
their idiosyncratic visions. To explore this question, we test
the performance of the Dual Index using alternative sunset
provisions ranging from five to twenty years.
Table 4 reports the back-testing results and reveals that
the performance of the Dual Index is higher for shorter sunset
windows but at the expense of higher return volatilities and
portfolio turnover. Indeed, the Sharpe ratio, that is, the ratio
of average excess returns divided by the standard deviation of
the excess return on each bespoke portfolio, is relatively flat
across the different sunset windows. It follows that per unit of
volatility the performance of the Dual Index is similar
regardless of the length of the synthetic sunset.
Table 4
Dual Index Performance (June 2009 to December 2019)
Sunset Length:
20 years 15 years 10 years 5 years
Monthly Return
1.60%
1.71%
1.67%
2.11%
Monthly Volatility
4.15%
4.32%
4.85%
5.35%
Annual Return
19.23%
20.47%
20.01%
25.38%
Annual Volatility
14.39%
14.95%
16.82%
18.54%
Cum. Growth of $1
$6.68
$7.53
$6.97
$11.74
Portfolio Turnover
5.7%
6.6%
6.6%
12.8%

Our evidence illustrates the range of possibilities in the
design of synthetic governance portfolios, although we do not
firmly advocate for a particular sunset window. Nonetheless,
our findings illustrate the fact that early-stage dual class
companies appear to generate higher returns for investors but
at the cost of causing them to bear additional risk. The
variation in Table 4 indicates the potential value of multiple
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dual class indexes using a variety of artificial sunsets which
reflect the risk preferences of investors. Again, we view this
as an advantage of synthetic governance, allowing investors
to select for their preferred governance provisions. To be clear,
our evidence does not directly speak to the value of the
alternative sunset lengths. Nevertheless, our evidence
demonstrates that the dual class structure may be most
valuable in the first few years post-IPO.
One significant question about the Dual Index is the extent
to which it truly evaluates the economic effect of a dual class
structure. Particularly as applied to the recently-public
technology companies, dual class voting structures may not be
the cause of excess returns but instead the consequence. That
is, companies that investors expect to outperform may, at the
IPO stage, be able to go public with governance structures
that investors would not otherwise tolerate. The fact that
those companies subsequently perform well does not provide
evidence on the counterfactual question of whether they
would have performed even better with a one share/one vote
structure. At the same time, we note that fewer companies are
choosing to access the public capital markets at all.132 The
availability of governance provisions that increase founder
insulation may increase a founder’s willingness to allow public
investors to share in the company’s growth. If governance
provisions that provide founder insulation are necessary to
induce unicorns to enter the public markets, the Dual Index
suggests that public investors are better off with such
companies than without them.

V. THE SPLIT INDEX
The Dual Index is but one example of synthetic
governance. It is possible to create indexes based on other
governance characteristics. For example, an independent
director index could be used to invest only in companies with
132 See JAY R. RITTER, INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: UPDATED STATISTICS 3
tbl.1 (2021), https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/IPO-Statistics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VG8B-GNAM] (showing that the number of IPOs per year
remains below historical highs).
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a specified proportion of independent directors. A staggered
board index could be used to invest only in companies with (or
without) a staggered board.133
To illustrate further the potential of synthetic governance
we create a Split Index which consists of companies that split
the positions of CEO and chairman of the board. Institutional
investors increasingly cite the separation of these positions as
an important measure of good corporate governance.134 The
theoretical idea behind this split is that it will cause a board
to have more oversight over the CEO and thereby make
economically-improved decisions.135 But, as with dual class
structures, the positive economic effect of splitting the two
positions has yet to be established.
We create the Split Index by obtaining annual CEOChairman duality data from Execucomp136 and identify the
role of chairman of the board by keyword detection in the
CEO’s yearly title. Specifically, our keywords include
“chairman” and “chmn,” and exclude “vice chairman” and
“vice-chairman.” We then create an index of companies that
meet this criteria.

133 Such an index would be particularly useful in generating evidence
for what appears to be a never-ending debate about the economic impact of
staggered boards. See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Independent Board Leadership, COUNCIL OF INST. INVS.,
https://www.cii.org/independent_board [https://perma.cc/5BRZ-V767] (last
visited Apr. 8, 2021) (“A CEO who also serves as chair can exert excessive
influence on the board and its agenda, weakening the board’s oversight of
management. Separating the chair and CEO positions reduces this conflict,
and an independent chair provides the clearest separation of power between
the CEO and the rest of the board.”).
135 See id. (“Having an independent chair helps the board carry out its
primary duty—to monitor the management of the company on behalf of its
shareowners.”).
136 On Execucomp, see Compustat Execucomp: The Basics, WHARTON
RSCH. DATA SERVS., https://wrds-www.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/griditems/compustat-execucomp-basics/ [https://perma.cc/CA4P-6LSV] (last
visited Apr. 9, 2021).
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Table 5
Split Index Performance (June 2009 to December 2019)
Split Index
Market Index
Monthly Return
1.31%
1.25%
Monthly Volatility
3.87%
3.75%
Annual Return
15.73%
14.98%
Annual Volatility
13.41%
12.98%
Cum. Growth of $1
$4.70
$4.38

The back-testing results in Table 5 show that the Split
Index outperforms the CRSP market benchmark by seventyfive basis points per annum. A one-dollar investment in the
Split Index would have grown to $4.70 between June 2009 and
December 2019. Over the same time, a one-dollar investment
in the market index would have grown to $4.38.
The findings thus highlight that indexes filtered by
corporate governance measures other than dual class status
can also earn excess returns above a benchmark. In addition,
the Split Index partially addresses the endogeneity problem
that we identified with respect to the Dual Index. Because an
issuer is not typically locked into split chair and CEO
positions through a charter provision, midstream changes
between combined and split positions are a regular
occurrence, an existing CEO rarely has the power to preclude
the shareholders or the board from splitting the two positions,
and an issuer cannot extract investor acquiescence in a
combined structure as the price of investing in the
company.137

VI. IMPLICATIONS
Our findings illustrate the facility with which bespoke
governance indexes can be constructed and used within our
137 See, e.g., generally Brian Patrick Eha, Will Wells’ Chairman-CEO
Split Force Other Banks’ Hands?, AM. BANKER, Jan. 11, 2017 (describing
Wells Fargo’s decision to adopt a bylaw splitting the roles of CEO and Chair
after the fake accounts scandal).
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capital markets to select for or against specific governance
provisions. If asset managers believe that dual class
structure, staggered boards, Nevada incorporation, or other
governance features systematically reduce firm value, they
can create specific or general “good governance” products that
offer their customers the opportunity to screen out issuers
that do not adhere to their identified best practices. If these
products accurately identify those governance provisions that
maximize firm value, synthetic governance products will
outperform their competitors, and assets will flow into these
funds. These inflows will, in turn, reduce the cost of capital to
issuers that adopt good governance practices.
To be sure, issuers may respond to the growth of synthetic
governance by modifying their governance features to qualify
for inclusion in governance-based index funds. This may have
an effect on future returns. Notably, however, this response
would demonstrate the potential disciplinary power
associated with enabling investors to choose an index strategy
based on governance. To the extent that a governance index
generates superior returns, investor assets respond by flowing
into the index, and issuers react by adopting the index’s
governance provisions, the capital market forces are working
effectively.

VII. CONCLUSION
Although the rise of intermediated investing has generated
extensive criticism, it offers a new mechanism for exercising
market discipline. Mutual funds already offer investors the
opportunity to invest in a passive fund that replicates the
performance of a broad-based market index or to focus on ESG
criteria in their investment decisions. The returns of these
funds provide empirical evidence on the relative performance
of their investment strategies.
We demonstrate that the potential of mutual funds
extends further and provides a tool to evaluate corporate
governance practices. To the extent that investor concerns
over particular governance features are well-founded, the
returns of governance funds enable fund flows to function as
a form of synthetic governance. Synthetic governance thus
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creates a neutral arbiter of governance that can dictate
preferred provisions through capital allocation.
We illustrate the potential of synthetic governance by
creating and evaluating an example: the Dual Index. The Dual
Index confirms that synthetic governance is a viable and
discrete possibility. It shows that, at least on a historical
basis, a synthetic index of dual class stock outperforms
applicable benchmarks. While this outperformance might be
attributable to selection effects or the enhanced protection
dual class provides to a founder’s idiosyncratic vision, either
way, investors benefit from the option to invest in the Dual
Index.
While synthetic governance is unlikely to end the debate
over which corporate governance provisions enhance firm
value, it offers a practical market-based response as an
alternative to broad-based regulatory reforms. By facilitating
the development of customized index products, securities
regulation thus offers a path forward to resolve what has
previously been a logjam in the debates over the efficacy of
corporate governance. Our findings suggest a role for the SEC
in fostering but continuing to monitor innovation which can
provide greater utility to our capital markets and enhance
investors’ opportunities for diversification and growth.

